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The End of Constitutional Exemptions
Steve Coughlan*
In R. v. Ferguson (reported ante p. 197) the Supreme Court decided that constitutional exemptions are not available as a remedy when a mandatory minimum
sentence is said to violate section 12 of the Charter. This is a well reasoned and
sensible decision. As mandatory minimum sentences are the context in which
the possibility of the constitutional exemption as a Charter remedy has most
frequently arisen, as a practical matter Ferguson largely disposes of the issue.
Nonetheless, a further clarification at some point that constitutional exemptions
are not available in any context, for other violations of section 12 or of any other
Charter right, would be a laudable follow-up.
Some clarification of terminology is in order since the way in which the phrase
"constitutional exemption" has been used has not always been entirely
consistent.
The primary meaning (indeed, I suggest the real meaning) of "constitutional exemption" is where a purportedly mandatory law is not struck down, but the law
is not applied to the individual receiving a remedy. As the Ontario Court of
Appeal phrased it in Hislop, a constitutional exemption "presupposes: (a) the
ongoing validity of the legislative provision; and (b) an unconstitutional effect
on the claimant from which relief is sought".1 As the Supreme Court decision in
Ferguson demonstrates, these two criteria are difficult to reconcile in the section
12 context. If the law has an unconstitutional effect on the claimant, then on a
reasonable hypothetical (the accused's facts) the law imposes cruel and unusual
punishment. In that event, it would violate section 12, and the presumption of
the ongoing validity of the legislation could not be maintained. On the other
hand, if the law continues to be valid, then the test for section 12 requires that it
cannot be said to have had an unconstitutional effect on the claimant. In the
section 12 context, a constitutional exemption is an attempt to have things both
ways.
In fact, that is true of any context in which a claimant might seek a constitutional
exemption. Fundamentally, as the Court notes here, this remedy undermines the
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rule of law. The Court has discussed the rule of law on many occasions. In Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd., for example, they stated:
This Court has described the rule of law as embracing three principles. The
first recognizes that "the law is supreme over officials of the government as
well as private individuals, and thereby preclusive of the influence of arbitrary power": Reference re Manitoba Language Rights, at p. 748. The second
"requires the creation and maintenance of an actual order of positive laws
which preserves and embodies the more general principle of normative order": Reference re Manitoba Language Rights, at p. 749. The third requires
that "the relationship between the state and the individual... be regulated by
law": Reference re Secession of Quebec, at para. 71.

A constitutional exemption, when it is meant as a general power for judges to
decide to dispense with the application of the law in "appropriate" cases, is unavoidably inconsistent with the second and third of these requirements. It replaces the rule of law with the rule of people.
For that reason, the decision in Ferguson should be expanded beyond section 12
cases to any situation where it is proposed that a law should remain in place and
not be declared invalid, but that the law should not be applied on this occasion.
The phrase "constitutional exemption" has sometimes been used to describe situations which do not undermine the rule of law in this same fashion. Those
remedies seem unobjectionable, though they would in future be better described
by a different name to avoid confusion.
First, the Court has used the phrase to describe giving a personal remedy to a
claimant who has succeeded in having a law struck down, but where that declaration of invalidity has been struck down. In Corbiere the Supreme Court described that situation as a constitutional exemption.3 It is noteworthy that they
cited Schachter4 and Rodriguez5 as examples, though in neither of those latter
cases did that situation actually occur. In any case, though, this situation is easily
distinguishable from the "ordinary" constitutional exemption. In the normal
case, the purpose of the exemption is to permit the law to remain on the books
and to declare that it does not violate the Charter. In the "suspension of invalidity" context, the opposite is true, because the law has already been declared invalid. There seems no reason based on the rule of law not to grant the individual
remedy in such circumstances: to the extent that there is a threat to the rule of
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law, it arises from the temporary validity of the invalid law, not from the individual remedy which is consistent with the invalidity.
Secondly, the Court has used the phrase "constitutional exemption" to describe a
form of testimonial immunity. Many administrative law schemes can compel a
person to give testimony which might also disclose evidence of criminal conduct. The general rule is that a person required to testify in this fashion has
derivative use immunity, so that the compelled testimony can be used for the
administrative scheme's purpose but not for a criminal prosecution. In some
cases, though, where a court is persuaded that the administrative scheme is being
misused to undermine a person's right against self-incrimination in the criminal
context, the person can be granted immunity from testifying at all. This approach to balancing the interests of administrative schemes and the accused's
self-incrimination interests were developed over a number of years in a variety
of cases: see for example S. (R.J.),^ British Columbia (Securities Commission) v.
Branch,^ Phillips v. Nova Scotia,^ and Jarvis? In Application under s. 83.28 of
the Criminal Code the Court referred to testimonial immunity in this context as
a constitutional exemption, though it had not used that phrase in this context
before.10
Calling for the complete elimination of constitutional exemptions also should
not affect this remedy, which really ought to be labelled differently. There is no
issue in this instance of an invalid law from the application of which the accused
is being excused. Rather, the violation comes from the misuse of a discretionary
power by some official. In that sense it is akin, for example, to racial profiling:
no one would suggest that a visible minority accused who was singled out based
on his or her race should be given a constitutional exemption from the law of
arrest. Rather the point would be that there is nothing wrong with arrest powers,
but they should not be misused for ulterior purposes. Similarly in the administrative compulsion/criminal prosecution context, the objection is not to the power,
but to its abuse. Simply describing this remedy as "testimonial immunity" would
be more accurate than calling it a constitutional exemption.
In short, anything not analogous to the use of constitutional exemptions in the
section 12 context should be labelled more accurately: everything analogous to
it should fall by the logic in Ferguson. Accordingly, constitutional exemptions
ought to never be available as a remedy for a Charter violation.
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